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ABSTRACT
This article considers the future of UN peace operations through a complexity
theory lens. In the short-term peacekeeping will have to adapt to the
consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the fall-out of the Trump
presidency. In the medium-term peacekeeping will go through a phase of
uncertainty and turbulence due to geopolitical power shifts in the global
order. In the longer-term peacekeeping will have to adapt to a new
multipolar global order characterized by coexistence, and a changing security
landscape shaped by, among others, climate change, urbanization, and new
technologies. Throughout these contraction, moderation, and adjustment
phases, UN peacekeeping is likely to be guided by a principled adaptive
approach, that allows it to adapt to the realities of the moment whilst
staying true to its core form and identity. As a result, UN peacekeeping is
likely to remain one of the most visible symbols of global governance and
international cooperation.
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In this article I will consider how UN peace operations may evolve over the
short (next 5 years), medium (5-15 years), and longer-term (beyond 15
years). In particular, I will analyze how peacekeeping operations, the UN
Secretariat that deploy them, and the UN members states that authorize,
contribute personnel and equipment, and pay for these operations, are
likely to adapt to setbacks and shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic; the
economic recession that will follow in the wake of COVID-19; slow onset
but tectonic shifts in geopolitical power relations, such as the rise of
China, and a changing security landscape due to, amongst others, climate
change, urbanization, and digitalization.
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In order to analyze how the international system of states, multilateral
organizations like the United Nations, and institutions like peacekeeping
respond and adapt to change, I will employ a number of insights from com-
plexity theory (de Coning, 2020b; Hunt, 2020). Complexity theory provides
us with a theoretical framework for analyzing how complex systems, like
societies, organizations, and institutions, function under stress, including
how they react to turbulence and disruptions in their environment
(Brusset et al., 2016; Kavalski, 2015). Complexity theory helps us understand
how social systems respond to external stimuli, and how their resilience and
adaptive capacity influence the likelihood that they will maintain functioning
despite significant changes in their operating environment (Folke, 2006).
Complexity theory holds that uncertainty and unpredictability are
inherent characteristics of complex systems (Cilliers, 1998). This uncertainty
is an intrinsic quality of complex systems, not a result of imperfect knowl-
edge, inadequate planning, or implementation (Popolo, 2011). The optimal
way to effectively manage such uncertainty is to engage in an adaptive
process that is emergent from experience and experimentation, and that
facilitates the co-evolution of UN peace operations with changes in the
global order and systemic shocks like the COVID-19 pandemic (de
Coning, 2020a).
Principled adaptation refers to a process of evolutionary change, in
response to transformations in a system’s environment where the adaptive
process is guided by a set of principles that help the system to maintain its
core identity and function (Folke, 2006). In the UN peacekeeping context,
these are the core doctrinal principles of consent, impartiality, and
minimum use of force (de Coning et al., 2017). Peter (2019) argues that
UN peacekeeping has remained true to its core principles, and maintained
its core identity, despite significant adaptations since it was conceived 73
years ago. During the post-Cold War period peacekeeping evolved from a
limited conflict management tool to a comprehensive conflict resolution
instrument. With the contemporary focus on protection of civilians and
stabilization, it has now started to swing back to conflict management
(Peter, 2019, p. 40). Over the course of this journey the principles of peace-
keeping has been interpreted differently, but the principles themselves, and
the core blue helmet identity of UN peacekeeping, has been remarkably resi-
lient (de Coning & Peter, 2019).
Resilience is a concept that enhances our understanding of how insti-
tutions like UN peacekeeping react to shocks, setbacks, and slow onset but
significant shifts in its environment (Chandler, 2014). In this context, resili-
ence refers to the capacity of an institution to absorb and adapt to shocks and
change whilst sustaining an acceptable level of function, structure, and iden-
tity under pressure (Dahlberg, 2015; Joseph, 2018). Resilience in this sense
can be seen as persistence, but it may involve both adaptations and
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transformations, where transformability is the capacity to cross thresholds
into new trajectories (Folke et al., 2010). I will argue that throughout the
forthcoming short-term contraction, medium-term moderation, and
longer-term renewal phases, UN peacekeeping is likely to be guided by a
principled adaptive approach, that will enable it to adapt and transform to
the realities of the moment whilst remaining resilient and staying true to
its core form and identity. As a result, UN peacekeeping is likely to maintain,
throughout this period of transition, its core role, function, and identity as
one of the most established and visible symbols of global governance and
international cooperation (Coleman & Williams, 2021).
Short-term contraction: Adapting to disruption caused by
COVID-19 and the Trump presidency
In the short-term (next 5 years), UN peacekeeping operations will have to
continue to adapt to the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and
the fall-out of the Trump presidency. According to a financing model
based on GDP, which the United States have negotiated and agreed too,
the United States should contribute approximately 28% of the UN peace-
keeping budget. The second largest contributor is China with approximately
15%. The Trump administration decided not to pay more than 25% of the
UN peacekeeping budget and to withhold some of its contributions to the
UN’s regular budget, and as a result the United States has accumulated an
arrears of almost $2 billion dollars by the end of 2020 (Lieberman, 2021).
This has caused a cash crunch in the UN Secretariat that has negatively
affected peacekeeping operations. The net effect is that those countries that
contribute the bulk of the UN’s peacekeepers (e.g., Ethiopia, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, India, and Rwanda), are in effect carrying a significant share of
the financial burden as the UN is unable to reimburse them within a reason-
able period for the costs they have incurred (Williams, 2018).
In addition, the Trump administration used the key role of the United
States in the UNSC and 5th Committee of the General Assembly to reduce
the overall UN peacekeeping budget by scaling down the size and scope of
current missions, and by bringing missions to a close as soon as possible.
As a result, between 2015 and 2019 the Trump administration contributed
to a 21% contraction of UN peacekeeping expenditure, amounting to
approximately $2 billion, which resulted in a 20.5% reduction in uniformed
and a 24% reduction in civilian personnel (Coleman, 2021). Complexity
theory shows that due to the importance of initial conditions and the
influence of path dependencies, flows like the financing of UN peacekeeping,
tend to continue for some time even after steps have been taken to interrupt
them. In this context the implication is that even if the new Biden
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 3
administration reverses these policies, it would take the UN years to recover
from the consequences of this loss of peacekeeping capacity (Meadows,
1999).
UN peacekeeping was already under significant financial pressure when
COVID-19 was declared a pandemic in March 2020. The COVID-19 pan-
demic has significantly disrupted UN peacekeeping operations. The UN
had to take urgent steps to avoid its peacekeeping operations becoming a
vector for the spread of the virus. The UN Secretary-General took the
drastic step of freezing all rotations between March and July 2020 (Khare
& Lacroix, 2020). In addition, UN peacekeeping missions reduced internal
movements to only the essential; made an assessment of the most critical
operations it needed to continue to carry out its mandate; made adjustments
to how those activities were carried out to contain the spread of the virus; and
changed the way the rest of the staff worked in order to achieve social distan-
cing. Thus, in a very short period of time, plans and activities at the UN
headquarters, regional service centers, and in peacekeeping missions were
adapted to reduce mission activities to the most critical tasks only (de
Coning, 2020a).
Most of the peacekeeping missions have adapted remarkably well, taking
into account that this disruption affected not only their operations, but simul-
taneously also the UN decision-making and logistical system, as well as the
host country. The COVID-19 pandemic has also resulted in closer cooperation
and planning among peacekeeping operations and the rest of the UN
system. UN agencies turned to peacekeeping missions for medical treatment,
protection, and evacuation, and missions and agencies cooperated on the pro-
curement and distribution of personal protection equipment and other
COVID-19 related supplies. At UN headquarters adaptation was facilitated
in a number of ways, including by identifying and sharing early lessons and
emerging best practices among missions, and by establishing an informal
clearing house mechanism for sharing lessons among the African Union
(AU), European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN.
The most severe COVID-19 related disruption to UN peace operations is,
however, likely to be caused by another side-effect of the crisis, a looming
global economic recession. The World Bank anticipate that advanced econ-
omies will shrink by 7%, and that this will spill over to emerging markets and
developing economies, which are forecasted to contract by 2.5% in 2021 (The
World Bank, 2020). There is thus likely to be less money available for UN
peace operations in the short- to medium-term.
Many of the more than 120 countries that have contributed peacekeepers
in the past, including big contributors like Ethiopia, Rwanda, Bangladesh,
India, and Pakistan (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020), may also come
under domestic pressure to reduce troop numbers for financial and
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coronavirus risk-related reasons (Kenkel, 2021). The UN may consequently
face a situation where it has much less funding and personnel available than
in the past.
Thus far Africa, where the bulk of UN peacekeepers are deployed, has been
spared the brunt of the pandemic, but this may change over time as the
number of infections increase. In several areas where UN peace operations
are deployed, including in the Central African Republic and Mali, and in
other countries like Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, violence increased in 2020
(Raleigh & Kishi, 2021). The demand for UN peacekeeping may therefore
increase in the short to medium-term, at the same time as COVID-19 and
financial pressures force UN peacekeeping to contract (de Coning, 2020a).
However, the financial constraints, together with other pressures on the inter-
national system, make it less likely that the UNSC will deploy new peacekeep-
ing operations or significantly increase the capacity of existing operations.
Complexity theory suggests that it would require a crisis of significant scale
to dislodge the UNSC from this pathway. This does not mean that the
UNSC will ignore these crises, but that it is likely to use instruments other
than large costly UN peacekeeping operations, such as mediation, Special Pol-
itical Missions, sanctions, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance, to try to
manage these crisis situations. The UNSC is also likely to increasingly turn to
regional organizations like the AU or other ad hoc arrangements when larger
security operations are necessary.
UN headquarters and peacekeeping missions have thus demonstrated
remarkable resilience in the way they have coped with, and adapted to, the
COVID-19 crisis. Some of the new innovations and practices that have
emerged in this process are specific to the pandemic. Others are likely to be
more lasting, including a prioritized-task approach to mandate implemen-
tation, a more adaptive approach to planning and mission management,
and greater utilization of digital technology. The most dramatic change over
the short- to medium-term, however, may be a significant further reduction
in funding and personnel as UN peacekeeping contracts in lockstep with a
COVID-19 induced global recession. Changes in the operational environment
and in the resources and capabilities available to UN peacekeeping will require
significant further adaptations to the way peace operations have been con-
ceived and conducted over the past 20 years. The most likely adaptation is a
shift away from the large peacekeeping and stabilization operations of the
2000s towards a variety of smaller more specialized peace operations.
Medium-term moderation: Adapting to the turbulence of a
global order in transition
In the medium-term (5–15 years) peace operations are likely to go through a
conservative phase as a result of the uncertainty and turbulence associated
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with a global order in transition (Osland & Peter, 2021). It will also still be
affected by the financial tail of the COVID-19 crisis and the downsizing of
the Trump administration. The uncertainty and turbulence associated with
a significant shift in the power-distribution in the global order that regulate
the international system, and the way this plays out in fora like the UNSC,
will make most states favor a conservative stance. This implies that it will
be unlikely that the UN will be mandated to launch robust, large, and
costly new UN peacekeeping operations or reform processes. In order to
avoid confrontations in the UNSC that can further escalate tensions
among permanent members, or other states that have influence in the
system, the UN system and member states are likely to self-regulate them-
selves by self-censoring the proposals they put forward, negotiate and
support in order to avoid controversy and confrontation. As we can see
from the Cold War period, when only 13 new peacekeeping missions were
deployed, peacekeeping during a period of transition is likely to be conser-
vative (Kertcher, 2012).
Some of these dynamics are already starting to emerge. No new peace-
keeping operation has been deployed since 2014. The new missions that
have been deployed, for example the UN verification mission in Colombia
and the UN mission to support the ceasefire in Hodeidah, both of which
are essentially ceasefire and peace implementation operations that have tra-
ditionally been the domain of peacekeeping, have been deployed as special
political missions. The new political mission (UNITAMS) that will replace
the joint African Union and United Nations peacekeeping mission in
Darfur is another case in point (Mamiya et al., 2020). Political missions
are potentially less controversial because they are seen as less of an impo-
sition on the sovereignty of the host state. In addition, these types of missions
do not include armed units and there is thus no use of force issues. Should
the peace process or ceasefire fail, the blame is more squarely on the parties
to the conflict as the UN presence is small and mandated only to support the
process. There is no expectation that they will physically protect civilians and
less likelihood of sexual abuse by peacekeepers or other such negative unin-
tended consequences (Aoi et al., 2007). It is thus easier to obtain approval for
special political missions in the UNSC because they are seen as less of an
imposition on national sovereignty, they are significantly smaller, have a
lighter footprint, and are less costly.
One of the innovations—or perhaps rather a mutation—of UN peace-
keeping in the early twenty-first century that is unlikely to survive this
phase of moderation is stabilization operations. The UN has deployed four
peacekeeping operations, in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA,
2014-), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO, 2010-), Haiti
(MINUSTAH, 2004–2017), and Mali (MINUSMA, 2013-), that have
included stabilization in their names. The UN Secretariat has resisted
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pressure to give doctrinal clarity to what stabilization means in the UN
context, despite specific recommendations to do so, including from the
2015 UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations.
UN stabilization operations represent a far more significant departure
from UN peacekeeping doctrine than the UNSC and Secretariat are willing
to recognize (de Coning et al., 2017). They differ in important ways from
the core principles from UN peacekeeping. Firstly, they do not have the
consent of the parties to the conflict in the form of a ceasefire or peace agree-
ment that includes a request to the UN to support the implementation of the
agreement. The only form of consent they have is an agreement with the host
state. As the host state is the only party that have provided consent, it is also
the only party that can withdraw consent, which provides the host state with
significant leverage.
Secondly, these missions are not impartial. They are specifically tasked to
protect the state and its people against certain identified aggressors and have
the mandate in some of these missions to proactively disrupt them. Whilst
these missions attempt to act impartially towards the various political
parties and factions in the country, they are not impartial towards the
parties to the conflict.
Thirdly, these missions have been authorized to use force under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. Whilst normal UN rules of engagement still require
the proportional use of force, they are no longer limited to use force only in
self-defense or only to protect civilians in imminent threat of violence. In
some missions they are tasked to pro-actively use force to disrupt the aggres-
sors, in order to prevent future threats to the government or people. In the
case of the Force Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO the mission was man-
dated to “neutralize and disarm” the M23 rebel group (Karlsrud, 2018).
UN stabilization operations have been unable to bring an end to the
conflicts where they are deployed because the more successfully these oper-
ations stabilize, the less incentive ruling elites have for seeking a political
settlement. The result is a no peace/no war stalemate, which leaves the UN
with no exit path. The longer the UN operation lasts, the more a political
economy develops around it—including wider UN system and bilateral
donor engagement—that benefits the elites in power, and those that seek
their patronage. Some ruling elites in these contexts thus prefer a no
peace/no war outcome because a settlement will require compromises and
power sharing that will reduce their power and access to sources of
revenue (Pospisil, 2019). At the same time, they can blame the external
actors for not solving the problem. These perverse side-effects of UN stabil-
ization operations harm the credibility of the UN and undermine the repu-
tation of UN peacekeeping. Their cost, these negative side-effects and the
overall lack of effectiveness of UN stabilization operations helps to explain
why the UNSC have started to pivot to special political missions. During
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the medium-term, there is thus unlikely to be much appetite or political
space for significant new doctrinal developments, or large-scale ambitious
stabilization or peacekeeping operations.
Longer-term: Finding a new role in an era of coexistence
In the longer-term (beyond 15 years), when the transition in the global order
has settled into a new pattern and there is a greater sense of stability, the UN
system, and peacekeeping as an institution, is likely to have space again to
play a more prominent role in maintaining international peace and security.
Complexity theory suggests that “stability” in the context of the international
system does not imply that there will be no conflicts, or that there will be no
rivalry amongst countries and ideologies. It only means that, in comparison
with the period of uncertainty and turbulence during the transition from a
unipolar to a multi-polar era, that the international system has settled into
a more predictable state of coexistence (Coleman et al., 2013). The need to
prevent and manage conflict and maintain international peace and security
will not disappear. During the preceding transition phase, the credibility and
values of the international system would have been under pressure and thus
the demand for peacekeeping would have been limited. Once a new order has
emerged there will be a need to consolidate, stabilize and maintain it, and
accordingly the scope for peace operations is likely to increase.
If we are entering a new multipolar era characterized by the coexistence of
multiple powers, then the UN system in general, and peacekeeping in par-
ticular, will need to adapt to and become symbols of the values that reflect
this new global order. A new understanding will need to emerge around
the role of the international system in international conflict management,
resolution and enforcement. Coexistence implies tolerance for a number
of different ideologies or models. In the post-Cold War era and into the
present, UN peacekeeping was used as a tool to promote the unipolar era’s
liberal peace ideology (Osland & Peter, 2021). In the medium- to longer-
term UN peacekeeping will shed its liberal identity and adjust itself to
reflect the values of coexistence, which implies a focus on political accompa-
niment, third-party impartial mediation, stability, and technical assistance
with recovery and state-building that is perceived as neutral (i.e., free from
ideologically pre-determined institutional models), so that national
systems can emerge that build on local cultural, historic, and contextual
foundations.
New emerging security challenges
Regardless of the constrains over the short, medium, and longer-term high-
lighted here, and because complex systems tend to innovate and adapt under
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pressure, it is likely that the UN secretariat, and specific UN missions, will
experiment with different ways in which they can be more effective through-
out these phases. Thus, despite these overall conditions and constraints,
peace operation as a practice is likely to continue to evolve, innovate and
adapt. Throughout these phases, peace operations will have to contend
with a number of new emerging peace and security challenges, some of
which are already now starting to emerge, including climate change, urban-
ization and new technologies.
Climate change exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and adds additional
stress to vulnerable communities and societies, and this may at times con-
tribute to conditions conducive to violent conflict (Krampe, 2019). Peace
operations will have to factor climate-related security risks into their analysis
and planning, and adapt their programmatic and operational actions to
ensure that they are climate-sensitive. Peace operations will also have to
pay more attention to their own environmental footprint, and change the
way they generate and consume energy, dispose of waste and manage their
carbon emissions (Holt & Hopkins, 2021).
Increased urbanization—75% of the global population is expected to be
urbanized by 2050 (Saghir & Santoro, 2018)—implies that most of the
violent conflicts that future peacekeepers will be tasked to manage are
likely to take place in urban contexts. This may require a significant adap-
tation from the type of large-territory mobile military peacekeeping that is
characteristic of contemporary peacekeeping, to a future urban public secur-
ity type peacekeeping model.
Lastly, digital technology is changing the way our social systems connect,
communicate and process information. Digitalization can contribute to com-
munity resilience and to sustaining peace in many ways, but it can also be used
to disseminate misinformation, stroke hatred and undermine social cohesion
(Hirblinger, 2020). Peacekeepers are tasked to prevent conflict, and this may
require that they disrupt those that use hate speech and other forms of violence
inducing rhetoric. On the other hand, they may support those that promote
peaceful means to resolve tensions and that advocate for moderation and tol-
erance. Either way, peace operations will have to become more adaptable at
operating simultaneously in the physical and cyber domains.
This is likely to result in the next major doctrinal revision—the current
capstone doctrine was finalized in 2008—which will most likely be preceded
by a strategic review along the lines of the High Level Independent Panel on
Peace Operations of 2015 (de Coning et al., 2017).
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that throughout the potential short-term con-
traction, medium-term moderation, and longer-term renewal phases, UN
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peacekeeping is likely to be guided by a principled adaptive approach, that
allow it to adapt to the realities of the moment whilst remaining resilient
and staying true to its core form and identity. As a result, UN peacekeeping
is likely to maintain, throughout this period of transition, its role as one of
the most visible symbols of international cooperation.
In the short-term (next 5 years), UN peacekeeping will have to adapt to
the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the downsizing of the
Trump presidency. These will include the most significant economic reces-
sion since the end of the World War II, which is likely to imply a further sig-
nificant contraction in the peacekeeping budget. Changes in the operational
environment and in the resources and capabilities available to UN peace-
keeping will require significant adaptations to the way peace operations
work and may signify a lasting shift away from the large peacekeeping and
stabilization operations that have characterized the first 20 years of the
twenty-first century.
In the medium-term (5–15 years), peace operations are likely to go
through a phase characterized by uncertainty and turbulence due a global
order in transition. During this phase there is unlikely to be much political
space or appetite for significant new policy or doctrinal developments, or
large-scale ambitious peacekeeping operations, and this is thus likely to be
a period of moderation. At the same time peacekeeping, even scaled-
down, is expected to remain one of the most established and visible
symbols of global governance and international cooperation.
In the longer-term (beyond 15 years), peace operations will adjust too and
reflect the global order characteristics of the era. If we are entering a new
multipolar era characterized by coexistence, then the UN in general and
peace operations in particular will have to reflect and promote these
values. There will be a need to consolidate, stabilize and maintain the new
international system, and international peace and security, and peace oper-
ations will have a role to play in this process.
Throughout these phases, UN peace operations will have to adapt to
changes in the security landscape such as the growing influence of climate
change and its peace and security related risks, the positive and negative
roles of new technologies and increased digitalization, and a shift in
violent conflict from rural to urban settings. UN peace operations will also
have to adapt to developments in the international peace and security prac-
tice, such as a shift from large-scale multidimensional and integrated peace-
keeping operations, to smaller specialized missions that form part of a
broader network of peacebuilding or stabilization activities; a greater focus
on data and performance and a shift to people-centered or bottom-up
context-specific approaches to peacebuilding.
UN peace operations have shown a remarkable resilient capacity to con-
tinuously adapt to new challenges over the past 70 years, and there is no
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evidence to suggest that it will not continue to do so into the future. As Peter
and I (2019) argue, despite the significant changes currently underway in the
global order, and the uncertainties that come with such turbulence, most
countries and regional blocs, such as the AU, EU, the Nordic region, and
the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), agree on and
repeatedly emphasize the importance of the UN, and UN peace operations,
as the centerpiece of global governance and a rules-based multilateral order.
Despite the short-, medium-, and longer-term changes UN peace oper-
ations are likely to undergo, UN peacekeeping is likely to remain the
flagship enterprise of the UN. This is because UN peacekeeping has
become one of the most remarkable achievements, and thus symbols, of
the post-World War II multilateral system of global governance.
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